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To Chris and Jane

If industry and labor are left to take their own course,
they will generally be directed to those objects which are
the most productive, and this in a more certain and direct
manner than the wisdom of the most enlightened Legislature
could point out.
James Madison

ABSTRACT
About 93.4 percent, approximately 25 million acres, of
the land area of the four counties comprising southern Nevada
is controlled by some government agency.

The control of such

a great amount of land may represent an impediment to the
action of a free market in southern Nevada.
The Bureau of Land Management (BLM) is the largest of
several government land managers, with three-fourths of the
acreage described above in its domain, and for that reason
this paper concentrates on BLM regulations and practices.
The BLM was created in 1946 with the merger of the Grazing
Service and the General Land Office.

The land it controlled

had not been claimed under previous efforts to put it in pri
vate hands and was called "the land nobody wanted."

Under

BLM stewardship this land became a vast "commons," overgrazed and consequently turned into a dustbowl.

The BLM had

little power until the passage of the Federal Land Policy and
Management Act (FLPMA) of 1976.
In addition to the FLPMA, four other laws have particu
lar significance to BLM land management actions in southern
Nevada: the Mining Law of 1872; the Wilderness Act of 1964;
the Endangered Species Act of 1973; and the Wild Horse and
Burro Act of 1971.

These laws and BLM actions resultant
iii

are examined in some detail with examples of how their
implementation impedes the free market.

The ability of

special interest groups to influence BLM decisions and
provide themselves a public good through the use of the
government, at taxpayers expense, is examined in several of
the examples.
The solution is privatization of the BLM controlled land
and abolition of the BLM.

This will not necessarily defeat

the motives of the special interest groups and will espe
cially help the taxpayer.

Chapter three explains why this is

possible.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The Problem
About 93.4 percent of the land area of southern
Nevada (Clark, Lincoln, Nye, and Esmeralda counties) is
controlled by government: city; county; state; or federal
(Nevada, Governor's Office of Community Services 1986,
399).

Because a system of property rights must exist

before an economic system can develop markets, the public
ownership of so much of the land would suggest that govern
ment land management presents an impediment to the action
of a free market in southern Nevada (Carroll 1983, 304).
Government tries to keep the land from being a commons, the
opposite of a system of private property, by assigning
quasi-rights through allotments, allocations, rule-makings,
and regulations.

This paper will examine the assignment

process, comment on its success, and offer suggestions for
improvement.
Although the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service; the
National Park Service; the Department of Energy; the U.S.
Air Force; and state, county, and city governments collect
ively control over 6 million acres in southern Nevada, they
are fragmented and insignificant compared with the Bureau
of Land Management (BLM) which directly administers over
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18 million acres.

The BLM also has surface management

responsibility for the Nellis Air Force Base Range, an
additional 2.2 million acres (U.S.

Department of the Inte

rior, Bureau of Land Management 1989a, 1-1).

Because the

other federal agencies have similar rules and because the
BLM controls so much land, this paper will focus on a
selected set of public laws that form the legal basis for
BLM land management.

The parent organization of the BLM is

the Department of the Interior (DOI).
Created in 1849, the Department of the Interior America's Department of Natural Resources - is
concerned with the management, conservation, and
development of the Nation's water, wildlife, mineral,
forest, and park and recreation resources (U.S. Depart
ment of the Interior, Bureau of Land Management 1977,
2 ).

The primary uses of BLM land in southern Nevada are
recreation, mining, and grazing.
Recreation encompasses such activities as hunting,
fishing, rockhounding, off-road vehicle operation and rac
ing, hiking, and camping.

Over 194,000 hunting and fishing

licenses were issued by Nevada in 1987.

The big game

animal which produced the greatest harvest was the deer,
with almost 22,000 taken.

The total take of waterfowl was

75,050 and the dove represented the greatest harvest of
upland game with 115,866 taken, followed closely by quail,
rabbit, and Chukar partridge (Nevada, Governor's Office of
Community Services 1988, 329-33).

Off road vehicle races,

sponsored by groups like the High Desert Racing Association
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and the Southern Nevada Off Road Enthusiasts, are held
regularly.

Additionally, three public camp grounds are

operated in southern Nevada by the BLM (Ibid., 313-14).
Fifty-five companies, with employment in 1987 of 1857
people, conduct mining operations in southern Nevada.
About 400,000 ounces of gold and 3,000,000 ounces of silver
were reported produced in the same year.

Other important

minerals produced were borates, cement, clay, diatomite,
gypsum, lime, lithium carbonate, and sand and gravel
(Nevada Bureau of Mines and Geology 1988, 23, 25-8, 41-52).
The magnitude of grazing is shown by the 1987 inven
tory of 89,000 cattle and calves and 2,000 sheep and lambs
in the four-county southern Nevada area.

Cash receipts

from livestock were $26,555,000 in the area in 1986
(Nevada, Governor's Office of Community Services 1988, 340,
342, 363).
Large areas of land are closed to public use of any
kind, for example, withdrawn land, like the Nellis Air
Force Base Range.

Some acreage, such as Wilderness Study

Areas, are limited to specified recreational uses.

Other

constraints to use, such as wetlands protection and floodplain assessments, implemented by Executive Order in
furtherance of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)
of 1969, discussed later, tend to limit access (U.S.
President 1977, 26961).
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History

_

Prior to the late 19th century, government land man
agement policy encouraged development of the west.

The

Homestead Act and the Railroad Act of 1862 literally gave
away millions of acres to settlers and the railroad indus
try (Nash and others 1986a, 453, 527).
The Mining Law of 1872, primarily authored by Senator
Stewart of Nevada, furthered development, stating that
11. . . all valuable mineral deposits in lands belonging to
the United States, both surveyed and unsurveyed, are hereby
declared to be free and open to exploration and purchase
. . . (Mining Law of 1872, 30 U.S.C.A, Sec. 22)."
Political philosophy began to change to conservation
in the late 19th century.

Prior to the turn of the cen

tury, "Much of the forested lands in the East and Midwest,
especially land that had been acquired cheaply or that was
still under public ownership, had been stripped of its
timber by private exploiters and left to erode and wash
away into the nearest river (Kremp 1981, 126)."

Teddy

Roosevelt, with the urging of Gifford Pinchot, a European
trained forest management specialist, and John Muir, an
organizer of the Sierra Club, caused the set-aside of 150
million acres of public land during his administration.
This began with the creation of the Yellowstone National
Park in 1872 (Nash and others 1986b, 713-14).

"Shortly

thereafter, in 1891, Congress passed the Forest Reserve
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Act, authorizing the president to withdraw public land for
the protection of trees.

...

In 1905, the Forest Service

was established to administer the land (Kremp 1981, 126)."
There was an obvious perception of market failure; the
belief that free markets did not foster the advancement of
society as a whole by allocating resources to their most
productive uses.

To overcome this perception, government

stepped to the fore to direct allocation.
The zeal which caused these initial set-asides con
tinued throughout the first part of the 20th century; so
much so, that most of the western half of the country has
never been relinquished by the federal government.
Although the initial conservation push was directed
at forested land, even if it was marginal, there was a
great reluctance on the part of the government to privatize
any land.
When homesteading was possible, a large portion of
"desert" land was ignored by settlers because its produc
tivity was low.

It was called "the land nobody wanted." It

did have value as marginal grazing land and became a free,
common pasture for cattle and sheep grazing.

It developed

into the classic "tragedy of the commons" and was soon
overgrazed.

Rather than selling the land to the ranchers

that were using it, the government responded with the
Taylor Grazing Act in June 1934, which created the Grazing
Service.

The Grazing Service was merged with the General
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Land Office in 1946 and the resulting organization was
called the BLM (Ibid., 126-8).
During the Johnson and Nixon administrations, there
was an "explosion" of regulatory laws (Higgs 1989, 246).
Four of these have particular significance to federal land
management actions in southern Nevada: the Federal Land
Policy and Management Act of 1976; the Wilderness Act of
1964; the Endangered Species Act of 1973; and the Wild
Horse and Burro Act of 1971.
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CHAPTER 2
LAWS, DISCUSSION, AND EXAMPLES
Federal Land Policy and Management. Act
The Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA) of
1976 is the organic act of the BLM.

It codified and per

petuated the functions that the BLM had acquired since
1946.

In section 102 of the FLPMA, Congress declares that

it is a policy of the United States that: (a) public lands
are to be retained in Federal ownership;

(b) public lands

are periodically and systematically inventoried and subject
to a coordinated land use planning process;

(c) classifi

cations of public lands completed prior to the passage of
this act be reviewed;

(d) Congress can execute its Consti

tutional authority to withdraw public lands; (e) the
Secretary of the Interior must establish rules and regu
lations implementing this act with consideration of the
general public; (f) judicial review of public land adju
dication decisions is authorized; (g) management of the
public lands be on the basis of multiple use and sustained
yield;

(h) public lands be managed in a manner that will

protect the quality of scientific, scenic, historical,
ecological, environmental, air and atmospheric, water
resource, and archaeological values; preserve and protect
some lands in natural condition; provide food and habitat
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for fish, wildlife, and domestic animals; and provide
outdoor recreation and human occupancy and use; (i ) the
government receive fair market value for the use of public
lands and resources; (j) uniform procedures be developed
for disposal, acquisition, or exchange of public lands;
(k) rules and regulations be developed for protection of
areas of critical environmental concern; (1) public lands
be managed such that the nation's need for minerals, food,
timber, and fiber is recognized; and (m) payment in lieu of
taxes is made to states because of the immunity of public
lands to taxation (FLPMA, 43 U.S.C.A., Sec. 1701).
As Hazlitt points out, "The art of economics consists
in looking not merely at the immediate but at the longer
effects of any act or policy; it consists in tracing the
consequences of that policy not merely for one group but
for all groups (Hazlitt 1979, 17).”

An examination of some

of these policy statements, with examples of their imple
mentation, follows.
Federal Ownership
The FLPMA, in section 203, makes it difficult for the
BLM to sell government land.

Three criteria apply:

(a) the

tract of land must be difficult or uneconomic to manage
because of its location or other characteristics; or
(b) the tract was acquired for a specific purpose which is
no longer valid; or (c) sale of a tract serves important
public objectives, such as community growth, which outweigh
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all other public objectives.

Further, the sale of any

tract over 2,500 acres must be submitted to Congress for
rejection.

Only if Congress fails to act within 90 days

can the sale take place (FLPMA, 43 U.S.C.A., Sec. 1713).
Even with these impediments, sales do take place.

Most of

the growth in the northwest part of the Las Vegas valley is
on land previously owned by the government.

A competitive

bid process is used, but the land must not be sold at less
than a fair market value as determined by the Secretary of
the Interior (Ibid.).

Since this land has always been in

the public sector, determination of the fair market value
is difficult, but is done by land appraisers using compa
rable recent sales of the same type of land.
The Secretary of the Interior may also modify the
bidding process or eliminate it completely "(1) to assure
equitable distribution among purchasers of lands, or (2) to
recognize equitable considerations or public policies,
including but not limited to, a preference to users
(Ibid.)."

In recognizing a preference to users, individ

uals with no connections rank fourth on the preference
list, after state and local governments and adjoining
landowners.

This policy can stifle the free market by

bureaucratically assigning rights to potential buyers
rather than letting the price mechanism of a free market
work.

It could encourage collusion and cronyism among

bureaucrats and their wards.

In a free market, both parties to an exchange believe
that they have benefitted.

The government, on the one

hand, is not benefiting, because of its policy to retain
this land in federal ownership.

On the other hand, land

sales do generate some revenue for the government.
explains this apparent dichotomy?
advanced by Fort and Baden.

What

One explanation is

"More support for a bureau

cratic agency can be generated by increasing benefits
selectively than by reducing costs generally.

It is

bureaucratically profitable to cultivate a concentrated
group of beneficiaries (Fort and Baden 1981, 12)."

In

short, selling land under favorable circumstances to a
connected individual or group that will or has supported
extension or maintenance of BLM actions is politically
profitable.
Even though some of these practices may be onerous,
the land disposed of in this manner eventually finds its
way into the private sector, where secondary sales are more
likely to be free market oriented.
No discussion is advanced in the FLPMA about why
these lands are to be retained in federal control as the
policy statement says.

Historically, as previously noted,

this was land that nobody wanted, most likely because there
was insufficient population and a lower level of technology
available for development of the land.
becoming a commons.

As Bish notes:

This led to its
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The usual suggestions for resolving the 'commons prob
lem' are either assigning complete property rights or
introducing a monopoly regulatory agency with the coer
cive power to limit access. . . . This problem is
clearly one that can emerge from competition among
politicians and bureaucrats to satisfy citizen pref
erences in a federal system (Bish 1987, 391).
Obviously, a monopoly regulatory agency was established.
But technology has advanced and the population has grown;
why is it still necessary to have federal control?

The BLM

created a system of pseudo-property rights for the land
under it's control by the use of rules promulgated after
public review and comment.

The segment of the population

that extensively uses public land has a vested interest in
this review and comment process.

Higgs advances the idea

of the mixed economy, part market and part government reg
ulated:
The most important legacy of the New Deal . . . is a
certain system of belief, the now-dominant ideology of
the mixed economy, which holds that the government is
an immensely useful means for achieving one's private
aspirations and that one's resort to this reservoir of
potentially appropriable benefits is perfectly legiti
mate (Higgs 1989, 195).
This means that it is in the interest of

those individuals

and groups that use the land to perpetuate the regulatory
agency, jockeying for relative advantage with other users
by proposing legislation or regulations favorable to their
cause and closely monitoring the public review and comment
process.

"The common observation that special interests

have inordinate influence upon a democratic State is with
out doubt empirically well founded.

. . . unorganized
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groups have some influence upon the policies of a demo
cratic State.

But other things being equal, groups which

organize and campaign for policies have a significant
advantage (Hummel 1990, 101)."
The majority of the public is apathetic to these spe
cial interests; the majority does not perceive that it is
being used, although that is clearly the case.

"A bureau

and its relatively few but passionately interested clients
. . . extract substantial benefits for themselves, imposing
the costs thinly over a much larger group of taxpayers or
persons who bear costs indirectly.

. . (Higgs 1989, 68)."

An example of that public apathy is demonstrated by partic
ipation in the scoping process for the forthcoming Tonopah
Resource Management Plan -Environmental Impact Statement.
"A Bureau of Land Management plan to decide future uses for
6.1 million acres of south central Nevada has generated
little interest although it involves one-eighth of the
property the BLM controls in Nevada . . .

(Myers 1990,

A 5 ).11 This land area comprises all of Esmeralda and the
northern one-third of Nye counties.

Public meetings to

obtain citizen input to this plan were held during March
1990 in Tonopah, Carson City, and Las Vegas.

The Las Vegas

meeting had 22 attendees, about one-fourth of the total
attendance for all three (U.S.

Department of the Interior,

Bureau of Land Management 1990a, 1).

Of those 22 people,

20 represented some special interest land user group.

"Obviously many political issues do not inflame the minds
and hearts of the populace . . .

Should the Department of

Agriculture or the Department of the Interior manage the
federal lands?

Few citizens care (Higgs 1989, 43)."

It is likely that these two issues, majority apathy
and special interest maneuvering, cause the retention of
these lands in federal control.
Inventory and Planning
The public lands are to be periodically and system
atically inventoried and subject to a coordinated land use
planning process.

Section 201 of the FLPMA directs the

inventory process:
The Secretary shall prepare and maintain on a
continuing basis an inventory of all public lands and
their resource and other values (including, but not
limited to, outdoor recreation and scenic values),
giving priority to areas of critical environmental
concern.
This inventory shall be kept current so as to
reflect changes in conditions and to identify new and
emerging resource and other values (FLPMA, 42 U.S.C.A.,
Sec 1711).
It is important to note that resources are defined as "rec
reation, range, timber, minerals, watershed, wildlife and
fish, and natural scenic, scientific and historical values
(Ibid., Sec. 1702)," a rather wider definition than is
normally applied.

This is because the NEPA requires that

policies, regulations, and laws of the United States
insure that "environmental amenities and values may be
given appropriate consideration in decision making along
with economic and technical considerations (NEPA, 4 2
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U.S.C.A., Sec. 4332)."
The planning process calls for the development, main
tenance, and revision of land use plans which, among other
things, require consideration of "present and potential
uses of the public lands," and the weighing of "long term
benefits to the public against short-term benefits . . .
(FLPMA, 43 U.S.C.A., Sec. 1712)."

The primary way the BLM

has of determining potential uses of the land or deciding
long term versus short term benefits is through public
input, because there is not a market, per se, available to
allocate the land resource.

Because of the general apathy

of the public, discussed earlier, most of the input comes
from special interest user groups.

This input is then

evaluated by BLM staff members of various professional
specialties and the plan is finalized.

In the general

summary of public comment on the Tonopah Resource Man
agement Plan - Environmental Impact Statement (RMP-EIS)
examples of special interest influence abound.

"For the

most part commentors feel there are too many wild horses
and burros, and they are not being properly managed . . .
participants . . . representing the livestock industry
commented that the RMP EIS revision was a ploy on the part
of environmentalists, the BLM, and other third party inter
ests to reduce livestock numbers . . . (U.S.

Department of

the Interior, Bureau of Land Management 1990a, 1, 2)." The
planning criteria issued for development of this RMP-EIS
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includes, among others: "Reasonable economic development
scenarios will be prepared based on existing levels of
mineral development and at least one alternative of a
higher level of mineral development (Ibid., 4)." These
scenarios will, at best, be guesses, because the drafters
of the plan cannot know what future mineral demand will be.
In a market situation, firms would develop and market
minerals as long as it was profitable to do so.

Hazlitt

succinctly explains:
One function of profits, in brief, is to guide and
channel the factors of production so as to apportion
the relative output of thousands of different commodi
ties in accordance with demand. No bureaucrat, no
matter how brilliant, can solve this problem arbitrar
ily. Free prices and free profits will maximize
production . . . (Hazlitt 1979, 161).
With no price mechanism to allocate resources because
there is no market, this inventory and planning process is
destined for failure.

"With private property rights and

open markets, relative prices can perform their information
and incentive functions to successfully coordinate individ
ual plans and efficiently allocate resources . . . (Dorn
1987, 295)."

Private property rights and open markets are

just the opposite of what the special interests groups
desire: " . . .

special interest political influence can

undermine the market economy by allowing these interests to
circumvent the discipline imposed by private property and
voluntary exchange (Lee 1987, 332)." There is not much
incentive for the preparers of the plans, and by extension,
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the grantors of benefits, because "Public organizations do
not directly concentrate the costs and benefits on decision
makers.

Hence, they have an incentive to shirk (Alchian

1968, 477)."

Rockwell is more pointed: "With the best

intentions, a bureaucrat can't know what's waste and what's
not, because he doesn't know what's economically desirable
in the first place (Rockwell 1989b, 2)."

There may even be

an incentive to be closely aligned with the special inter
est groups.

"Bureaucrats of even the purest intentions

cannot be expected to produce results consistent with the
welfare of their wards if by so doing they harm their own
professional welfare (Fort and Baden 1981, 13)."
Multiple Use and Sustained Yield
Multiple use is defined in the FLPMA as "management
of the public lands and their various resource values so
that they are utilized in the combination that will best
meet the present and future needs of the American people
. . . (FLPMA, 43 U.S.C.A., Sec. 1702)."

Sustained yield is

meant to be "the achievement and maintenance in perpetuity
of a high-level annual or regular periodic output of the
various renewable resources of the public lands consistent
with multiple use (Ibid.)."

These are noble goals, but it

is problematic that they are attainable within the public
sector; only in the private sector; there is not a market
mechanism available to allocate the resources.
In an economic order based on private ownership of the
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means of production the market is the focal point of
the system. The working of the market mechanism forces
capitalists and entrepreneurs to produce so as to sat
isfy the consumer's needs as well and cheaply as the
quantity and quality of material resources and of man
power available and the state of technological knowl
edge allow (Mises 1985, 49).
As early as the 15th century, it was recognized that commu
nal ownership of property would not produce "multiple use
and sustained yield," as this policy statement requires.
The Spanish Late Scholastic period of thought provides the
argument, "Privately owned productive goods are more fruit
ful because it is natural for men to take better care of
what is theirs than of what belongs to everybody; hence the
medieval proverb,

'A donkey owned by many wolves is soon

eaten' (Chafuen 1986, 55)."
The action that is actually taking place in the mul
tiple use and sustained yield arena is that the BLM serves
as a referee between three factions:

(1) mining, non-

locatable mineral production, and on occasion, land
developers;

(2) cattle and sheep grazing; and (3) wildlife

and environmental coalitions of many types.

All of these

groups have managed, through lobbying or influence in other
regulatory channels, to provide themselves a public good
without having to pay market prices for the good.
When a group successfully provides itself a public good
through the market, the resources it expends pay
directly for the good. In contrast, when a group
successfully provides itself a public good through the
State, the resources it expends only pay the overhead
cost of influencing State policy. The State then
finances the public good through taxation or some
coercive substitute (Hummel 1990, 102).
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These groups are now so entrenched in the regulatory and
legislative process that the BLM frequently turns to them
for research for the many plans and documents that are
published (U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 1987, Acknowl
edgments ) .
Some of the groups seem to believe that they have
quasi-ownership of the public lands.

A recent Supreme

Court decision illustrates that point, as well as the
internecine warfare that occurs among the groups.

In

the case of Lujan versus National Wildlife Federation, the
decision favored 2,250 BLM grazing decisions, which the
Federation contended were aesthetically wrong.

Had the

Federation won, serious damage would have been done to the
grazers.

In a friend of the court brief filed by the

American Farm Bureau Federation was the statement: "For
generations, families have built ranches around the right
to graze cattle on the federal lands.

. . . Unfortunately,

because of continued federal administrative control of
those grazing rights, the very right of western ranchers to
hold the grazing rights
hoods

and thus continue their liveli

has been subjected to judicial review at the

request of special interest groups (Springer News Bulletin
1990, 5)."
In the minutes of the July 19, 1990 meeting of the
State Land Use Planning Advisory Council there is recorded
discussion of a major land use acquisition where there are
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located environmentally "sensitive areas."

In this dis

cussion there is the statement: "The Nature Conservancy
became interested and had Congress appropriate $1 million
into the BLM budget to acquire the land (Nevada, Department
of Conservation and Natural Resources 1990, 10)."
As these examples show, it frequently appears that
these lands are not being managed for the benefit of all
the American people.
Preserve, Protect, and Provide
It is a policy of Congress that public land be
managed:
. . . in a manner that will protect the quality of sci
entific, scenic, historical, ecological, environmental,
air and atmospheric, water resource, and archeological
(sic) values; that where appropriate, will preserve and
protect certain public lands in their natural con
dition; that will provide food and habitat for fish and
wildlife and domestic animals; and that will provide
for outdoor recreation and human occupancy and
use . . . (FLPMA, 43 U.S.C.A., Sec. 1701).
This is the part of FLPMA that provides legal stand
ing for each special interest group to sue the BLM, or it's
parent, the DOI, when it perceives that the BLM has made a
ruling that favors some other group.

The BLM or the DOI is

in constant litigation, having been sued in the recent past
by wildlife groups, Indian nations, and even other units of
government, as well as others.
This language requires that public land management be
all things to all people.

In order to defuse this dichot

omy, a seemingly endless string of Environmental
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Assessments (EA), Environmental Impact Statements (EIS),
and Management Plans, with the requisite public input as
required by the NEPA, are prepared for BLM actions; hope
fully appeasing each group by allowing it's views to be
aired; forestalling litigation.

In reality, however, this

process can be used as a delaying tactic by opponents of
the action being contemplated.
prepared.

An EA is the first document

It's purpose is to 11 . . . briefly provide suf

ficient evidence and analysis for determining whether to
prepare an environmental impact statement or a finding of
no significant impact . . . (Department of the Interior,
Bureau of Land Management 1988, Glossary, 2)."

If an EIS

must be prepared; and litigation, or the possibility of
litigation, frequently forces an EIS; it is required in the
document that alternatives to the proposed action be devel
oped and fully explained, along with any environmental
impacts (Ibid., 6).
action.

This opens the door for further legal

It is not unusual for an entire EA-EIS process to

take years, because there are several points where public
comment is required.

All of these comments must have a

response in the final EIS.
None of this is inexpensive.

In addition to the in-

house BLM work, EA's and EIS's are frequently contracted
out.

The costs per document range from the tens of thou

sands of dollars for small projects to the more than $12
million that the Air Force paid for the MX missile system
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EIS.

These costs are ultimately borne by the taxpayer.

All of this is done to preserve and protect the public
lands.
Fair Market Value
It is a policy of Congress that " . . .

the United

States receive fair market value of (sic) the use of the
public lands and their resources unless otherwise provided
for by statute . . . (FLPMA, 43 U.S.C.A., Sec. 1701)."
Since "fair market value" is difficult to acertain because
of the lack of a market mechanism, an examination of how
rates are determined is instructive. Grazing fees are a
good example.

The FLPMA directed that:

The Secretary of Agriculture and the Secretary of the
Interior shall jointly cause to be conducted a study to
determine the value of grazing on the lands under their
jurisdiction in the eleven Western States with a view
to establishing a fee to be charged for domestic live
stock grazing on such lands which is equitable to the
United States and to the holders of grazing permits and
leases on such lands.
In making such study, the Sec
retaries shall take into consideration the costs of
production normally associated with domestic livestock
grazing in the eleven Western States, differences in
forage values, and such other factors as relate to the
reasonableness of such fees (FLPMA, 43 U.S.C.A., Sec.
1751).
The ultimate outcome of this study turns out to be a com
plex formula which is used to set the fee annually.

The

fee is set at a $1.23 base per animal unit month (AUM),
which was established by the 1966 Western Livestock Grazing
Survey, multiplied by an escalation factor which is the
Forage Value Index (FVI) added to the Beef Cattle Price
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Index (BCPI) minus the Prices Paid Index (PPI); then
divided by 100.
Grazing Fee/AUM = $1.23 x

FVI + BCPI - PPI
— .... —
100

Further, the fee can never be less than $1.35 per AUM or
vary more than 25% from the previous year (U.S. President
1986, 5985).

An AUM is the amount of forage needed to

sustain one cow or one horse or five sheep, all over six
months old, for one month (Nevada, Governor's Office of
Community Services 1988, 288).
The Forage Value Index is a weighted average estimate
of the annual rental charge per head per month for private
rangeland in 11 western states where the most public land
is located (Montana, Idaho, Wyoming, Colorado, New Mexico,
Arizona, Utah, Nevada, Washington, Oregon, and California)
divided by $3.85 and multiplied by 100 (U.S. President
1986, 5985).
The Beef Cattle Price Index is the weighted average
annual selling price for beef cattle in the 11 states for
November through October divided by $22.04 per hundred
weight and multiplied by 100 (Ibid.).
The Prices Paid Index is composed of nine components
from the National Index of Prices Paid by Farmers for Goods
and Services, individually weighted.

The components are:

fuels and energy; farm and motor supplies; autos and
trucks; tractors and self-propelled machinery; other
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machinery; building and fencing materials; interest; farm
wage rates; and farm services (Ibid.).
Examination of this formula illustrates the diffi
culty inherent in setting prices when there is no market
mechanism available.

If it is set too low, grazers are, in

effect, given a government subsidy and inefficient produc
ers are encouraged to stay in the market.

If it is set too

high, even efficient producers may be driven from the mar
ket, causing a reduced supply of livestock and upward
pressure on prices for beef and mutton.
The Forage Value Index uses private range fees as its
basis.

Since the 11 states used are those where the most

government controlled range occurs, the amount of private
range is relatively small.

Because private range is com

peting with government range, its price would be driven to
the level of the government range, unless it is extraor
dinary in its ability to support livestock.

Also, the

private range owner would, most likely, be pasturing his
own livestock, especially if the range is extraordinary.
If this were the case, there would be no empirical data
available, because rental fees would not exist and they
would have to be estimated.

Consequently, calculation of

this index, which is computed by the Statistical Reporting
Service from the June Enumerative Survey, could be prone to
error.
By setting a minimum grazing fee of $1.35 per AUM, a
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floor is established for rental fees for all western graz
ing land.

Private range owners could charge a lower fee,

but with relative scarcity of private range and a finite
limit on animal carrying capacity per acre, they would soon
be inundated.

This demand would only encourage private

range owners to raise their fees to at least the government
floor.

Since grazing is a factor of production for beef

and mutton, the government floor price means the consumer
could be paying a higher price for beef and mutton if the
real market fee were lower than the floor.
The stipulation that the fee cannot vary more than
25% from year to year is probably designed to stabilize the
industry by removing some amount of future uncertainty.
However, if the escalation factor, which is substituting
for free market supply - demand dynamics, would indicate
that grazing fees should be up over 25%, then marginal pro
ducers who would be priced out of the market are allowed to
stay, at taxpayer expense.

If the indication is for more

than a 25% reduction, the consumer is paying too much for
beef.
The government-set grazing fee may perfectly reflect
a market price for grazing rentals, but that is impossible
to determine without an operative market mechanism.

Simple

annual bidding by ranchers for the right to graze livestock
would remove what has to be an expensive process of bureau
cratically determining the fee.

This would allow
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variations across the region, as well as reflect local
forage quality differences.

Going even further, priva

tization of the land would result in contracts between
individuals and eliminate the need for government inter
action with grazing fees entirely.
Minerals, Timber, Food, and Fiber
It is also a policy of Congress that ". . . the pub
lic lands be managed in a manner which recognizes the
Nation's need for domestic sources of minerals, food, tim
ber, and fiber from the public lands . . . (FLPMA, 43
U.S.C.A., Sec. 1701)."
sales management.

An example of this is aggregate

Aggregates, various grades of sand and

gravel, are used, for example, in concrete, in paving mat
erial and for fill material.
Most of the aggregates used for construction in
southern Nevada come from community pits located on BLM
managed lands.

The spectacular growth in the Las Vegas

valley has increased aggregate demand significantly in the
past several years.

Approximately 90 operators draw aggre

gates from the BLM pits.

They report the amounts they

remove, and consequently pay for, on an honor system, pre
sumably because BLM does not have sufficient personnel
to continuously monitor the pits.
A summary of sales for five pits named East, Salt
Lake Highway, Lone Mountain, North Jean Lake, and Pahrump,
for fiscal year 1989, a 365 day period, shows that 119,74 2
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cubic yards of aggregate were removed.

The sales summary

for the same pits for November 1, 1989, through February
26, 1990, a 117 day period, shows a removal of 229,942
cubic yards (U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of
Land Management 1990c, 1).

The amount of aggregate removed

virtually doubled in only 3 2% of the time.
There are several possible reasons for this dramatic
increase in sales.

The first is that the BLM met with

about half of the operators (all were invited) to urge hon
esty in reporting.

The second is that construction may

have accelerated at an astronomical rate, however the 117
day period coincides with a slowdown in construction caused
by the listing of the desert tortoise as an endangered
species.

The most likely reason is that BLM biologists

were surveying the pits for desert tortoise during this
period.

The presence of BLM vehicles probably caused more

accurate reporting.
No matter what the reason, the figures tend to indi
cate serious under-reporting in 1989, with the attendant
loss of revenue.

As Higgs observes, "Business interests

frequently profit from constraints on the market economy
(Higgs 1989, 244)."

Because BLM employee pay is not linked

to profit or loss, there is no incentive to watch the pits
closely.

That is unlikely to be the case under private

ownership.
In a profit-driven business, the wages of each employee
tend to reflect his contribution to total output.
But
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incomes in a bureaucracy are based on a non-market,
government-wide grading system. The only way for the
bureaucrat to increase his income is through longevity
and promotion, which comes through passivity and obedi
ence, not innovation or productivity (Rockwell 1989b,
2 ).

Because of the FLPMA and the Common Varieties Act, where
even mining claims which would provide limited privat
ization are banned for aggregates, privatization of
commercial activities like this are not possible (Common
Varieties Act of 1955, 30 U.S.C.A., Sec. 611).
Minina Law
An Act to promote the development of the mining
resources of the United States was signed into law on May
10, 1872.

With a few important exceptions, it remains

unchanged to the present time.

The purpose of the act

indicates that the government, at that time, wanted to
place public land into the private sector, stating that
"...

all valuable mineral deposits in lands belonging to

the United States, both surveyed and unsurveyed, are hereby
declared to be free and open to exploration and purchase
. . . (Mining Law of 1872, 30 U.S.C.A., Sec. 22)."

A

patent conveying ownership of the land comprising a claim
or claim group could be obtained relatively easily with the
filing of appropriate affidavits, proof of $500 worth of
improvements on the property, and payment of $5.00 per acre
for lode claims or $2.50 per acre for placer claims.
Because technology then available would not support rapid
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exploitation of mineral deposits and as a guard against
claim "jumpers,11 many mining operations obtained patents.
This is primarily the reason for the patchwork sections of
private land near Tonopah, Goldfield, and Beatty.
Through the years since adoption of the 1872 mining
law, the regulations promulgated by federal land management
agencies and various court decisions have made the patent
ing process time consuming and quite expensive.

The

process is now so restrictive that essentially the claim
owner must have a fully developed, operating mining busi
ness that can prove profitability, in order to obtain a
patent.

The cost of a mineral survey and the various other

document filings required can easily exceed revenues.

For

these reasons, and because the owner of a valid unpatented
claim can remove all the valuable, locatable minerals and
then walk away after minimal reclamation of the site, very
few claim owners seek patents; there is no incentive
(Lancaster 1990, 1L).
An unpatented claim has a bifurcated title: the
claimant has title to all the valuable locatable minerals;
the government retains title to everything else.

The gov

ernment receives no royalties or payments from the claimant
for the minerals he removes; in effect, giving the minerals
away in exchange for retaining "multiple use" of the land
for the public.

Thus, the taxpayer subsidizes the mining

industry on public lands.

Mining may be, in fact, the
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highest and best use of some parts of the public land.

If

there is development of a working mine, the multiple use
concept is, in actuality, inoperative, and should be recog
nized as such.

It is an interesting dichotomy that grazing

fees, for example, are charged for a renewable resource,
while nothing is charged for a depletable resource.
Another significant change in interpretation of the
mining law is the doctrine of pedis possessio. possession
by foot.

Originally the intent of the law was that the

prospector discover a valuable vein or placer deposit;
erect a location monument at that point; stake the corners
of his claim, not exceeding the maximum size allowed; and
then file the claim with the county recorder.

From the

time of corner staking on, his claim was protected from
other prospectors.

He could hold it for an indefinite

period of time by filing an affidavit each year attesting
that $100 worth of labor, called assessment work, had been
performed on the claim for that year.

As the science of

geology advanced, however, courts held that the discovery
requirement need not be observed, as long as the other
requirements were met and the claimant diligently pursued
discovery of minerals predicted by geologic inference.
This was the doctrine of pedis possessio.

Diligent pursuit

was proven by the annual assessment work.

This was a boon

to large, well financed, legitimate mining companies.

It

also spawned the "nuisance" claim, where legal extortion is
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the motivation.

All projects that are proposed on public

land are potential targets of nuisance claims, because they
cannot be kept confidential.

The nuisance claimant is not

interested in minerals, only in impeding the project enough
that his claim title will be purchased.

Rather than go to

court and suffer delay or excessive legal fees, many nui
sance claims are purchased by the harried project.

The

Department of Energy recently paid $249,000 for the relin
quishment of 23 claims at Yucca Mountain, for example
(Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land Management
1989b, 14), even though previous studies and explorations
revealed no economic quantities of valuable minerals
(Department of Energy, Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste
Management 1986, 3-23).
Wilderness Law
The Wilderness Act of 1964 directed the Secretaries
Agriculture and the Interior to review the National For
ests, National Parks, wildlife refuges, and game ranges to
locate areas suitable for preservation as wilderness (U.S.
Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land Management 1987,
1987, 5).

Section 2(c) of the Act defines wilderness:

A wilderness, in contrast with those areas where man
and his own works dominate the landscape, is hereby
recognized as an area where the earth and its community
of life are untrammeled by man, where man himself is a
visitor who does not remain. An area of wilderness is
further defined to mean in this Act an area of undevel
oped Federal land retaining its primeval character and
influence, without permanent improvements or human hab
itation, which is protected and managed so as to
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preserve its natural conditions and which (1) generally
appears to have been affected primarily by the forces
of nature, with the imprint of man's work substantially
unnoticeable? (2) has outstanding opportunities for
solitude or a primitive and unconfined type of recre
ation; (3) has at least five thousand acres of land or
is of sufficient size as to make practicable its pres
ervation and use in an unimpaired condition; and
(4) may also contain ecological, geological, or other
features of scientific, educational, scenic, or histor
ical value (Wilderness Act of 1964, 16 U.S.C.A., Sec.
1131).
This review ultimately culminated in the Nevada Wil
derness Protection Act of 1989, which set aside 417,000
acres of land in southern Nevada National Forests as wil
derness (Nevada Wilderness Protection Act of 1989, 16
U.S.C.A., Sec. 1132).
BLM administered public land was not included in this
search for wilderness until passage of the FLPMA in 1976.
The FLPMA directed the review of all road-less areas of
5.000 acres or more using the characteristics of a wilder
ness described in the Wilderness Act (FLPMA, 43 U.S.C.A.,
Sec. 1782).

The results of this review must be submitted

to the Secretary of the Interior in 1991.

It will then be

forwarded to the President and ultimately to Congress for
action.

The implementation of this review consisted of an

inventory of all public lands to eliminate those which
obviously did not meet the criteria.

The remaining lands

were designated Wilderness Study Areas (WSA's).

There are

2.365.000 acres of land in WSA's in southern Nevada (U.S.
Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land Management 1986,
1).

These WSA's are currently undergoing detailed study
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including an EIS for each one.

Some number of these WSA's

will be recommended to Congress for inclusion in the
National Wilderness Preservation system.

It is likely,

after this process has come to its conclusion, that 2 or 3
acres of wilderness will be designated for each resident of
southern Nevada.
Development, of any kind, in any of these areas is
prohibited, " . . .

there shall be no commercial enterprise

and no permanent road within any wilderness area . . . "
and, except for emergencies, " . . .

there shall be no tem

porary road, no use of motor vehicles, motorized equipment
or motorboats, no landing of aircraft, no other form of
mechanical transport, and no structure or installation
within any such area (Wilderness Act of 1964, 16 U.S.C.A.,
Sec. 1133)."

Because of these restrictions, there will

probably be very little usage of this land for recreation,
as was intended by the law, because few people have the
inclination or the physical conditioning to hike into these
areas.

In fact, this is exactly what the law was designed

to do - provide solitude for a very few people.
What has happened here is that a small coalition of
environmental groups has successfully provided itself a
public good through the government at the expense of the
general taxpayer.

This can happen because the coalition is

organized and politically astute.

Hummel explains: " . . .

the democratic State makes it much easier to enact policies
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that funnel great benefits to small groups than to enact
policies that shower small benefits on large groups (Hummel
1990, 102)."

The large group, in this case, is the

remainder of the public.

This could be viewed as indirect

appropriation of property: a taking; therefore unconstitu
tional, after all, these lands belong to all the public.
"To take -indirectly if not directly -other people's prop
erty for one's own benefit is now considered morally
impeccable, provided that the taking is effected through
the medium of the government (Higgs 1989, 195)."
Endangered Species Law
"Thirty-six endangered or threatened species are
native to Nevada, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service says
(Foster 1990, 10B)."
" . . .

The Endangered Species Act of 1973

was hailed as a visionary stand for wildlife

decimated by habitat destruction, pollution and over
hunting (Ibid.)."

In the findings section of the Act;

The Congress finds and declares that - (1) various spe
cies of fish, wildlife, and plants in the United
States have been rendered extinct as a consequence of
economic growth and development untempered by adequate
concern and conservation; (2) other species of fish,
wildlife, and plants have so depleted in numbers that
they are in danger of or threatened with extinction;
(3) these species of fish, wildlife, and plants are of
esthetic, ecological, educational, historical, recrea
tional, and scientific value to the Nation and its
people . . . (Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16
U.S.C.A., Sec. 1531).
The implementation of the Act begins when the Secre
tary of the Interior is petitioned by a person requesting
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that a species be listed as threatened or endangered.

The

definition of person is quite lengthy, but essentially it
is any entity subject to the jurisdiction of the federal
government.

The "person" frequently is a wildlife or envi

ronmental group; for instance, the petition requesting
endangered status for the desert tortoise was filed by the
Environmental Defense Fund, the Natural Resources Defense
Council, and the Defenders of Wildlife (Department of the
Interior, Fish and Wildlife Service 1990, 12179).

The

Secretary is then required to rule on the petition, taking
into account the best scientific evidence available.

If

approved, regulations defining conservation measures for
the species, including designation of critical habitat, are
issued.
cies.

This makes it illegal to "take" the listed spe
Take means " . . .

harass, harm, pursue, hunt,

shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect; or to
attempt any of these . . .

(Ibid., 12190)."

A recovery plan must be developed for each listed
species, describing site specific management actions, esti
mates of costs and time required, and criteria for removal
from the list should the plan succeed.

An example is the

recovery plan for the Ash Meadows area west of Pahrump.
Rather than preparing individual plans for each species,
this plan covers a 23,094 acre area containing critical
habitat for 12 listed species; four types of fish, one
aquatic insect, and seven types of plants (U.S. Fish and
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Wildlife Service 1987, 4).

Included in this area is land

controlled by several government agencies and some private
land which the government intends to acquire or control.
The degradation in this area is blamed on private commer
cial operations during the 1950's and 60's.

The major part

of the land was purchased by the Nature Conservancy in 1984
and resold to the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service which
established the Ash Meadows National Wildlife Refuge
(Ibid., 6).

BLM involvement in this plan has been the

withdrawal from mineral entry of 2,681 acres of land, cap
ture of wild horses, and fencing of 425 acres to keep
horses out (Ibid., 36-7).

The criteria for recovery, so

that these species can be removed from the list, is stated
as follows: " . . .

when threats have been removed and when

habitats and populations have been restored, to the levels
determined as being required by research, for a period of
10 years (Ibid., 39)."

Since the estimated cost for the

first three years of this plan is over $3 million, it
becomes obvious that this will be an expensive, lengthy
project (Ibid., 156).
The " . . .

Act assumes that preserving one species

has enormous value or benefit . . . Advocates . . . con
tend that the process of evolution has endowed each species
with a genetic accumulation of characteristics that
enhances its chances of survival.

If a species becomes

extinct this genetic history disappears forever and cannot
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be passed along to future species.

The loss of any single

species detracts from the genetic pool . . . and reduces
the range of possibilities for future adaptation (Copeland
1990, A 1 4 )."

This view is not shared by all.

"There is

general agreement among scientists that todays' species
represent a small proportion of all those that have ever
existed —

probably less than 1%.

This means that more 99%

of all species ever living have become extinct (Ibid.)11
"Mass extinctions have been recorded since the dawn of
paleontology (Gould 1989, 305)."

The view that every trait

must be preserved to ensure survival is debated in the sci
entific community.

"A trait with no previous significance,

one that had just hitchhiked along for the developmental
ride as a side consequence of another adaptation, may now
hold the key to your survival (Ibid., 307)."

"The evolved

survival traits of an endangered species are no more
valuable than the traits of the new species that will even
tually evolve after its extinction (Copeland 1990, A14).11
If it is true that saving a species does not necessarily
increase survival chances of future generations, why would
environmental groups push for strict enforcement of the
Act?

Copeland suggests that " .

. .

saving species is

often a subterfuge for achieving other goals, such as the
prevention of development (Ibid.)."

The listing of the

desert tortoise on August 4, 1989, seems to substantiate
that possibility.

That listing was an emergency endangered
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listing.

The final rule on April 2, 1990, reduced the

listing to threatened, ahd responded to public comments
(Department of the Interior, Fish and Wildlife Service
1990, 12178-83).

Several comment responses illustrate

Copeland's assertion:

The first comment questions the

listing itself, because many factors that adversely affect
the tortoise are beyond human control.

The response says,

in part, "The act does not distinguish between humaninduced and natural threats.

Hence, if there existed a

natural threat to the continued existence of a species,
listing would be appropriate even if humans could do noth
ing to minimize the threat (Ibid., 12181)."

A second

comment says that listing of the tortoise will adversely
affect private property values and restrict the use of pri
vate land.

This response says, "Economic considerations

may not be used in listing determinations.

The tortoise

will be protected from take wherever it occurs (Ibid.,
12182)."

Another comment suggests that the Las Vegas val

ley should be excluded from the listing because it would
cause economic hardship, and furthermore, factors indicate
that a long-term viable tortoise population in the valley
is unlikely.

After reiterating that economic consider

ations cannot be considered, the response goes on, " . . .
listing of a species is not predicated on the species'
ability to recover.

While the maintenance of a long-term

viable population of the desert tortoise in the Las Vegas
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Valley may be unlikely, this information actually points in
favor of listing rather than against listing (Ibid.,
12183).
About half of the desert tortoise habitat is on BLM
administered land (Ibid., 12190).
plan is being developed.
listing 11 . . .

A habitat conservation

In the meantime, the tortoise

is blamed for delaying flood control pro

jects and housing tracts . . .

in Las Vegas (Foster 1990,

10B)."
Endangered and threatened species preservation is an
emotionally charged issue.

Humans inherently abhor the

extinction of a species, however, it is perceived by some
group or individual that every species that is listed
impacts the ability to carry on some vocation or avocation.
This is probably true in varying degree.

The desert tor

toise listing caused cancellation of the annual Barstow to
Las Vegas motorcycle race, slowed or deferred construction
projects, and is seen by grazers as a ploy to reduce live
stock numbers.
No one owns a wild species; title to land only gives
ownership to species habitat or access to that habitat.
This law, unlike the others discussed, applies to both pri
vate and public land, consequently it's application has the
ability to constrain property rights, to the detriment of
the market.
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Wild Horse and Burro Act
It is the policy of Congress that wild free-roaming
horses and burros shall be protected from capture,
branding, harassment, or death; and to accomplish this
they are to be considered in the area where presently
found, as an integral part of the natural system of
public lands (Wild Horse and Burro Act, 16 U.S.C.A.,
Sec. 1331).
So begins the Wild Horse and Burro Act, possibly the best
example of a minority interest group creating a public good
for itself through the use of the government.

There are

about 26,000 wild horses on BLM land in Nevada (GreenDavies 1990, 3B).
southern Nevada.

A large percentage are located in
A wild horse or burro is defined as

" . . . all unbranded and unclaimed horses and burros on
public lands of the United States (Wild Horse and Burro
Act, 16 U.S.C.A., Sec. 1331)."
Prior to the passage of the Act there were relatively
few wild horses and burros.

An example of this is the

Nevada Wild Horse Range, an area of 394,000 acres within
the Nellis Air Force Base Range, where some wild horses
were known to exist historically.

From a June, 1962, Coop-

Cooperative Agreement between the Air Force and BLM:
Identifying the area for horse use will provide an area
which can be managed for the horses and their habitat.
It is reliably estimated on the basis of counts by the
State Fish and Game Department that more than 200
horses now run in this area. This approximate number
of wild horses will be maintained as long as their use
of the range remains in balance with the forage
resources available (U.S. Department of the Interior,
Bureau of Land Management 1989a, C-l).
In contrast, this statement was made this year about the
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number of horses on the entire Nellis Range:
Wild horse numbers are estimated at 6,400 head, 220
percent in excess of initial management number (sic);
the resulting overuse of available forage continues
to degrade the ecological condition on 81 percent
(1,784,000 acres) of the Planning Area (U.S. Department
of the Interior, Bureau of land Management 1990b, 3-3).
What could have happened to cause the population to
increase to 3 2 times its original reported size?

The Wild

Horse and Burro Act was passed into law in 1971.

Histor

ically, the Nellis Range was grazed by livestock, wildlife,
and wild horses.

In 1979, the entire northern boundary of

the Range was fenced to keep livestock out and allow more
forage for horses.

Simultaneously, water sources were

developed and maintained by the BLM, the Air Force, the
Department of Energy, and the National Wild Horse Associ
ation, a Las Vegas based interest group (U.S.

Department

of the Interior, Bureau of Land Management 1989a, D-3).
With no competition for food and more water, the population
grew rapidly; to the point that they have outstripped their
available food and water supply and regularly die of mal
nutrition or dehydration (Tripathi 1990).

Excess numbers

of horses cause other problems: "Vehicular traffic related
accidents along the main access road to the Tonopah Test
Range kill or injure an estimated 50 horses annually
(Ibid., 4-9),"

The assumption can be made that these

accidents probably also cause human injury and property
damage.
Wild horse special interest groups have virtual con-
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trol over this facet of the BLM's operation.

Public meet

ings on the Nellis Range EIS were held in Alamo, Tonopah,
Caliente, and Las Vegas.
total public apathy.

As noted before, there is almost

Consequently, 14 people in total

attended the four meetings; all in Las Vegas.

Of those 14,

six oral statements were made, with five of those speakers
associated with wild horse groups.

Ten organizations with

"horse," "burro," or "mustang" in their names are listed as
being solicited for comments on the EIS.

An additional

five organizations in the list have broader interests, but
have advocated wild horse and burro causes (U.S.

Depart

ment of the Interior, Bureau of Land Management 1990b,
4-6).

The general membership of these groups appear to

have little economic interest in supporting wild horses and
burros; their interest is mainly philosophic and aesthetic.
A newspaper article discussing a recent BLM proposal to
capture burros in the Gold Butte area near Lake Mead
because of overcrowding stated: "BLM officials plan to
capture the burros Aug. 26, provided there are no legal
protests by any animal-rights groups to the Internal Board
of Land Appeal, a division of the U.S. Interior Department
. . . The National Environmental Policy Act requires the
BLM to notify any interested parties prior to a capture of
wild burros or horses.

...

An appeal would stop the

capture until the board made a final determination (GreenDavies 1990, 3B)." Virtually every BLM plan for a solution
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to the burgeoning wild horse population results in a chal
lenge.

The groups seem especially adamant about livestock

grazing to the perceived detriment of wild horse forage
(Wild Horse and Burro Act, 16 U.S.C.A., Sec. 1331).
One BLM solution to the overpopulation problem is the
adopt-a-horse program, where the animals are captured, and
for a small fee, released to individual citizens.
interest groups grudgingly go along with this.

The

A local

representative of the National Wild Horse Association said
11 . . . the adoption program is better than just letting
the horses die in the desert (Karaim 1990, 5A)."
there is a price.

"The program has cost $81 million since

1985, an average of $1,500 a horse (Ibid.)."
again " . . .

However,

And once

the general taxpayer often finds himself

subsidizing the destruction of the environment while making
transfer payments to bureaucrats and highly specific spe
cial interests (Baden and Stroup 1981, 6)."

43

CHAPTER 3
THE SOLUTION
In General
The examples in Chapter 2 show what " . . .

was common

knowledge among the founders of our constitutional order:
majoritarian democratic processes can, without proper consti
tutional constraints, easily accommodate the plunder of some
for the benefit of others (Wagner 1987, 324)."
result of the mixed economy.

This is a

"The most common methods of

governmental control have been not explicit takeovers but
rather heavy taxation and subsidization (often in hidden
forms) and, especially, extensive regulation of ostensibly
private activities (Higgs 1989, 240)."
Stroup state " . . .

Further, Baden and

we are increasingly convinced that both

the environmental and the economic costs of bureaucratic
management of natural resources are excessively and unneces
sarily high.

These social costs are generated by perverse

institutional structures that give authority to those who do
not bear responsibility for the consequences of their actions
(Baden and Stroup 1981, 1)."

"From time immemorial govern

ments have been eager to interfere with the working of the
market mechanism.

Their endeavors have never attained the

ends sought (Mises 1985, 58)."
The solution, briefly stated, is abolition of the BLM
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and privatization of the land it controls.

This would cause

some amount of pandemonium and a great hue-and-cry from the
special interest groups.

However, when the land is auc

tioned, the outcome for these groups may, in fact, be better.
By selling the land to the highest bidder, the highest and
best use of the land will be determined by the market.

The

interests of future generations, a reason for holding the
land in public trust, will be maintained by more concerned
and involved management of the land.

Analysis follows.

Mining and Minerals
Mining claims, as discussed previously, have a bifur
cated title.

A claimant, under the Mining Law of 1872, owns

the mineral rights, and this solution would recognize that
ownership.

The land, the part owned by the government, would

be put up for auction.

There would be a strong incentive for

the present claimant to buy the land, especially if there
exists a profitable mine, thereby reuniting the title.

If

the claimant were out-bid, then he would have to negotiate
with the new land owner for access to the land to recover his
minerals, but that is the purpose of contract law.

If the

land being sold does not have mining claims, then the mineral
rights would be sold in conjunction with the land.
Some of the biggest complaints about mines by environ
mentalists are " . . .

an ugly legacy of poisoned streams,

abandoned waste dumps and maimed landscape (Lancaster 1990,
1L)."

This would be less likely under private land owner
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ship.

It is inevitable that the valuable mineral being mined

will ultimately be depleted.

The miner will want to dispose

of his improvements and the land, if he is the landowner, to
recover costs.

This means the property will need to be made

attractive to prospective buyers.

If the miner is not the

landowner, the owner will, if he has been diligent in his
contract, require reclamation to his specifications.

In

either case, the land will be restored to a salable con
dition, which is not now necessary.

The reclamation

requirement of the BLM is not severe and, as conservationists
complain, laxly enforced (Ibid., 3L).

This is one reason

that mining companies no longer seek patents; they can walk
away from physical alterations they have made on BLM land
with a small amount of clean-up when the valuable mineral has
run out.

Later; usually years, and frequently at the urging

of environmental groups, whatever environmental hazard that
has been produced by the defunct mine will be rectified at
taxpayer expense.
At this point in the privatization process, the true
value of the minerals being mined will still not be known,
because the government gave the mineral title to the claim
ant.

Ultimately, however, as these mines are depleted,

miners will need to search on the now private land and some
one, other than the government, will own the mineral rights.
Lease arrangements, royalties, sale, rents or some other
mechanism will price one of the factors of mineral pro-

duction, the ore itself, and the true value will be apparent.
This may tend to raise prices of minerals, but the market
will determine the quantity required.
Within the market society the working of the price mech
anism makes the consumers supreme. They determine
through the prices they pay and through the amount of
their purchases both the quantity and quality of pro
duction.
They determine directly the prices of all
material factors of production and the wages of all hands
employed (Mises 1985, 49).
Obviously, there will no longer be a place for the
Mining Law of 1872 and it can be discarded.

The previously

discussed nuisance claims will not be possible when the land
is privatized, in fact, claims of any type will be impos
sible.
For the so-called saleable and leasable minerals, like
aggregates, which were not possible to claim, the land and
mineral rights would simply be sold together and, aggregate
sales, for instance, would become private business ventures.
Grazing
Grazers, as opposed to mining claimants, do not own
title to anything.

They do, however, have a lease arrange

ment with the government, allowing them to graze a BLM
determined number of livestock on their grazing allocation.
When the land is sold it will be necessary to make the sale
of land with grazing leases subject to the lease for its
duration to avoid litigation.

The fee and number of live

stock allowed to graze could be open to negotiation, however.
This would be moot if the grazer using the land bought it.
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When the lease duration expired, the restriction on the land
owner would be lifted and the owner would be free to do what
he wished with the land.
It is quite likely that efficient grazers who have been
profitable under the current system would opt to bid on the
land they have been using.

Their competition would most

likely come from environmental, wildlife, and wild horse
groups, discussed later.

Many grazers have used the same

lands for generations and have installed improvements such as
water facilities and corrals with the blessing of the BLM.
The reason this was allowed was because wildlife and wild
horses would also benefit.

The ability to operate without

the constraints of BLM's multiple use land management prac
tices would probably allow the grazers to run more livestock
on less land than they had previously used.

Their range

would become more efficient because it would no longer be a
commons.
The 'tragedy of the commons' occurs when the value to
users is sufficiently great that users overuse and
destroy the commons, leaving everyone worse off than they
would be had they been able to agree on a more complete
assignment of property rights for rationing purposes
(Bish 1987, 390).
Wilderness. Environment, and Endangered Species
The 12 largest environmental groups have annual revenues of
about $250 million (Stroup 1990, A14).

Adding in research

organizations and the host of smaller activist groups would
probably bring the total near one-half billion dollars.
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These groups have tremendous monetary power and are, obvi
ously, supported by a significant minority of the population.
Their actions, to date, have been committed to supplying
their memberships with a quasi-public good at the expense of
the taxpayer.
The major environmental groups are committed to pro
tecting the environment by exerting political pressure to
change statutes, court interpretations of statutes and
executive branch regulations. The tax laws require that
they limit their spending on direct lobbying to 20% of
their revenues, but in essence their entire program bud
get is designed to change government laws and practices.
Typically, this effort represents close to 75% of their
total budget (Ibid.).
In this solution all of the BLM land will be auctioned off,
including WSA's, endangered species habitat, and areas of
environmental concern.

The environmental interests could use

their revenues to purchase the tracts of greatest concern to
them.

"If environmental groups really want to save endan

gered species . . . they would do well to consider applying
their ample revenues to purchasing land or protective ease
ments.

Using some of their funds for purchase could give

them a permanent impact that is elusive today (Ibid.)."

This

would do much more for the environment than lobbying and
lawsuits.

It would also allow the groups to have the wilder

ness they so much want to themselves because they could
exclude others.

It is possible that they may become entre

preneurial and charge admission to enter their habitats.
Some of the old-time groups have been, for years, pur
suing the market approach.

The Nature Conservancy and Ducks
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Unlimited are two examples.
The Nature Conservancy has been using markets since 1951
and now owns and manages nearly 2.6 million acres of land
selected to preserve endangered wildlife or plants. . . .
Ducks Unlimited, for example, spends $30 million a year
to lease or purchase conservation easements and to create
wetlands (Ibid.).
A growing problem is terrorism by environmental fringe
elements.

This solution would serve to diffuse violence for

two reasons:

the private landowner is more likely to keep a

watchful eye on his property and the groups themselves could
buy areas where they are currently applying guerrilla tactics
to discourage development.

As Bandow notes,

. . . pork-minded legislators need to abandon the sort of
spendthrift and ruinous management policies that have
rightly angered many environmentalists.
Land should be
privatized and subsidies ended. That abuses exist is no
excuse for violence, but reforming current policy would
reduce people's incentive to violate the law (Bandow
1990, A14).
Wild Horses
The wild horse groups would have essentially the same
incentives as environmental groups.

They would want to

acquire the most desirable range for horses and fence it to
keep their charges contained.

This is because the Wild Horse

and Burro Act is predicated on vast tracts of public land
that will no longer exist, consequently, the Act itself
becomes unnecessary.

The horses, being considered a part of

the land would be owned by whoever bought the land.

This

does not mean that wild horses and burros will cease to
exist, only that they will be free to roam only in whatever
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preserve the advocacy groups purchase.

It is possible that

the numbers of horses will be reduced, but their individual
physical condition will probably improve because their habi
tat will be managed by ardent supporters for their benefit
only, exactly the benefit that private ownership provides.
The horse groups, too, may become entrepreneurial and charge
admission to see the horses.
Recreation
It is unlikely that recreational groups would bid on any
of the land and they shouldn't need to.

Hunting and fishing

can be arranged with individual landowners, as they are
throughout the Midwest.

Rockhounds could do the same thing.

Hikers, backpackers, and campers will probably belong to an
environmental group and have access to the same areas as they
do now.

Off-road races are now mostly confined to estab

lished routes because of endangered species concerns, and
there is no reason to believe that race promoters would not
be able to lease or rent race courses from the new land
owners .
Indians
The Western Shoshone tribe believes that is owns most of
the center of southern Nevada through the Treaty of Ruby
Valley.

Indeed, Article V of the Treaty indicates that

" . . . the boundaries of the country claimed and occupied by
said bands . . . " is a huge area (U.S. 1863).

Unfortu-
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unately, Article VI gives the President of the United States
the authority to move the tribe to reservations within that
area, where they are " . . .

to reside and remain therein

(Ibid.).11 This article was exercised.

The Shoshones have

brought several lawsuits, with different plaintiffs, against
the United States.

All of these have ultimately ended in the

Supreme Court, with the United States winning.

Compensation

of between $20 and 30 million has been offered by the govern
ment, but the Shoshone, a proud people, have never accepted.
The simple fact is that they would like to run their cattle
or sheep, unrestricted by boundaries.
This solution could solve this problem.

At this point

in time, the Shoshones are mostly grazers, but still adhere
to their religious beliefs about the sanctity of the land,
plants, and animals that occur in southern Nevada.

When

the land is auctioned, the compensation that has been offered
by the government could be put into an account for the
Shoshones, and they could use it to bid on the land.

There

is a strong likelihood that they could regain a good portion
of their ancestral land.
The BLM
The BLM, as a branch of the Interior department, would
cease to exist after it auctions the land.
an easy task.

This would not be

"The worst defect with public operations is

probably not so much starting improper services as getting
them stopped . . . Public suppliers have much more leverage
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to keep the revenues coining from taxpayers than they do from
unsatisfied users (Gunderson 1990, 199).”
” ...

Higgs points out

bureaucracies are easier to create than to destroy;

hence . . . bureaucrats, and the number of rules they issue
all increase irreversibly over time (Higgs, 1989, 68).”

The

BLM illustrates this last point with about 1560 pages in
Title 43 of the Code of Federal Regulations.
The local employees of the BLM should have little trou
ble finding employment.

The new owners of the land will need

people to manage wilderness, mineral exploration, range
land, and the other uses in which the BLM has specialists.
Unleashed from the bureaucratic system, and now responsible
for their actions, these people will have every incentive to
excel.

"Only with entrepreneurial freedom will the inno

vation required to increase prosperity occur (Stroup 1987,
408) ."
The Taxpayer
Because " . . .

freedom and prosperity are incompatible

with extensive regulatory or tax/transfer powers in the hands
of government (Ibid.)," the taxpayer should benefit from this
solution for public lands.

This solution will eliminate a

part of government bureaucracy.

"In the case of the career

bureaucrat, the maximization of personal welfare becomes
inextricable from the maximization of his agency's welfare,
particularly its budget (Fort and Baden 1981, 14)."

The BLM

part of the budget would disappear, easing the burden on the
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taxpayer.
As discussed before, the land should become more pro
ductive under private ownership, because it is no longer a
commons.

This, too, will benefit the taxpayer.

The general

increase in prosperity caused by greater productivity will
increase tax revenues to governments, which could allow lower
rates for everyone.
The money received by the government from sales will
also benefit the taxpayer.

Although per acre receipts are

not likely to be high (remember, this is the land nobody
wanted, and in many cases, this is probably still true), even
at $10 per acre average, total revenue would amount to $180
million in southern Nevada.
This solution benefits the taxpayer in every way: less
government; lower taxes; and more productive use of resources
leading to greater prosperity.
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